



Contemplative Wisdom


Contemplative Wisdom: The Goal of a Dominican Education

Kurt Pritzl, OP, PhD

Saint Thomas Aquinas argues in the *Summa Theologiae* 2-2.188.6 that a life combining contemplation with action is superior to a life of contemplation alone. By action here he does not mean any activity based on rational forethought but activities such as teaching and preaching (*sicut doctrina et praedicatio*), which are based on what he calls “the fullness of contemplation” (*ex plenitudine contemplationis*).¹ The argument that he offers is this: “for just as it is better to illumine than merely to shine, so it is better to give to others the things contemplated than simply to contemplate” (*Sicut enim majus est illuminare quam lucere solum, ita majus est contemplata aliis tradere quam solum contemplari.*). This passage is a source for a motto of the Dominican Order “to contemplate and to share with others what is contemplated” (*contemplare et contemplata aliis tradere*) a motto that animates Ohio Dominican University and other genuinely Dominican schools.

Thomas’s position about the superiority of the mix of contemplation and action over contemplation alone entails the following points. [1] Contemplation alone is not action or doing something by effort of will. In itself it is an event or occurrence of rest or repose, of being and having rather than doing, acting, or making. [2] Since contemplation and action are better than contemplation alone, action must add something that contemplation lacks and that fulfills or completes it. In this life, at least, the two together are better than rest alone. [3] Whatever action brings to the mix, however, Thomas holds that contemplation has primacy and priority with respect to action, and therefore, rest has primacy and priority over action. This is because the action in question is sharing what is contemplated. Thomas can hold that the mix of

contemplation and action is better than contemplation alone because the mix of contemplation and action is saturated with contemplation the *contemplated* is what is to be shared. There must be shining, shining that is beheld, in order for there to be illumining.



Contemplation, teaching, and preaching are achievements of the human intellect. The primacy and priority of rest to action with respect to contemplation, teaching, and preaching that Thomas sees is connected to deeper and more basic positions about the primacy and priority of rest with respect to action within human intellection itself. In this lecture I want to talk about these deeper and more basic positions about the human intellect that give primacy to rest over action in the life of human thinking and knowing. Our interest in contemplation in this lecture, then, is quite focused and specific. It is to look at Thomas’s basic account of thinking itself to see how rest has primacy with respect to motion for every human intellect. This is to lay bare the contemplative dimension inherent in our capacity for thinking and in the actual thinking of every human person. Therefore this lecture considers contemplation precisely with respect to what gives the human intellect every human intellect, yours and mine the ability to contemplate and it reflects on the fact that all our thinking includes within it bits of contemplation, which we develop, ignore, or counteract in the course of our intellectual activity and cognitive life. Ohio Dominican University, by the way, as it lives out its Dominican outlook, stands for the first option.

For Thomas Aquinas, I am claiming, rest has

primacy over action or motion. The philosophical alternative the opposite position is to give primacy to action or motion over rest. Friedrich Nietzsche is a good example of a philosopher who does this, and in a complete way. Nietzsche considers the human intellect to lack rest of any kind in its cognitive life. It is completely a tool for doing and making in service to the human will and its creative drives as humans cope with reality in constant flux.

It is useful to keep this difference between Aquinas and Nietzsche in mind. The fundamental issue is whether the human intellect is capable of rest and possesses acts of rest within the course of its actual life and career or whether the human intellect is completely and thoroughly in motion and always actively doing and making in every aspect of its ongoing life. The former is Aquinas; the latter is Nietzsche.

This lecture, as the title says, is not only about contemplation. It is also about wisdom. In fact it joins them. The lecture title speaks of “contemplative wisdom.” I hope to present a connection or link between contemplation and wisdom, and it will be much like the connection between rest and contemplation mentioned already. If all of us have intellects that function by rest at least as much as by action, then all of us are contemplators. If all of us are contemplators, then all of us even you and me can be wise. And if we have the ability to be wise, we have the responsibility to do so, a responsibility to ourselves, that is, to our own fulfillment and happiness, and a responsibility to others.

My position denies, then, any claim of wisdom based on the Nietzschean alternative, namely, that wisdom can be found in the human power of will and mastery over nature that Nietzsche takes to be the glory of human life. My position denigrates the complete primacy of action, doing, making, and creativity that Nietzsche accords to us humans and that makes our intellectual lives incapable of contemplation in Thomas’s sense.

To assert one position over another is not to argue or establish the position. Philosophy in its essence includes arguing for positions as well as presenting the alternatives. This address aims at philosophy, but our limited time precludes a reasonably full argument for the position on contemplation and wisdom that philosophers like Thomas and Aristotle advocate, since that position is so fundamental and deals with some of the most complex and deep matters of the nature of the human person and the world in which

humans find themselves. There is an argumentative structure to the lecture, however, with two parts worth mentioning at the outset.

[1] Much of the lecture presents Thomas’s position in contrast to Nietzsche’s. This contrasting is itself an important task of philosophy, namely, to make and explore distinctions and alternatives. Rest and motion, contemplation and action, intellect and will—to develop both sides of these distinctions, to consider whether they are genuine distinctions or not (is there, after all, as some philosophers have argued, only rest, only motion, only contemplation, only action, only intellect, or only will?), to see which side of the distinction has primacy over the other or how they interrelate constitutes an essential part of doing philosophy. When it is done well, it not only displays the logical alternatives, but it points out paths of truth, since it allows reality to display itself.

[2] To present alternatives, to draw implications from them, and then to consider the implications of the implications, so to speak, is a worthwhile form of argumentation. If it turns out the Aquinas’s position makes contemplation and wisdom humanly possible whereas Nietzsche’s opposite position does not, that may be a warrant for one position over another.

Let me add one other note about the nature of this lecture. We used to have a cook at the Dominican House of Studies in Washington where I live who would answer the question “what are we having for dinner tonight?” with one word, “food.” Philosophical analysis works requires generalization. Moving to a highly general level can seem un-informative and boring, but it is one of the most important and exciting parts of philosophy, when it is done well. Philosophers like Thomas, Aristotle, and Nietzsche are intellectual geniuses for their daring analyses, which claim to see the most basic patterns and structures within the vast complexity of some reality or other. In the case of this lecture, we will be much considering Thomas’s and Aristotle’s analysis of human thinking. It is an analysis which makes highly general claims that constantly must be considered in terms of actual human thinking in all its complexity, variety, and richness. We do not have time to do this latter work, but you can carry it on in your heads as we proceed.

What follows consists of two parts. The first part discusses thinking as both rest and motion and the interrelation between the two types of thinking. The second part connects contemplation with being wise. This look at contemplation and wisdom is based on a

philosophical account of the human intellect drawn from Aristotle and Aquinas. It is an account shared by them in its basics, but when I resort to details, they are mostly from Aristotle, since my own studies concentrate in his thought.

1 Thinking as Both Rest and Motion

Aristotle and Aquinas argue that there is a basic distinction in human intellection. Once the point is made that intellection or thinking is universal awareness, in contradistinction to sense perception, which is particular awareness, this distinction is probably *the* most basic distinction to be made regarding human intellection. This is the distinction between *nous* or *intellectus*, on the one hand, and *dianoia* or *ratio*, on the other, as two irreducible ways of thinking. It is not that we have two human intellects within us, but that we have intellects capable of two fundamentally different acts (see *ST* 1.79.8). The one act is an occurrence of rest, repose, sheer possession, or having. The other act is an occurrence of motion, movement, activity, doing, or making.

1a. Thinking as *Nous* or *Intellectus*

Nous or *intellectus* is thinking that is a sheer resting with or apprehending of an object of thought, an object of thought that acts on or is given to the intellect. The intellect does not do anything in some sense of exerting itself in order for this awareness or cognition to occur.² It is sufficient to be alive and awake for a human to have this kind of thinking, which Aristotle and Thomas consider to be our foundational intellectual experience of reality.

To understand this better, it helps to recount some basics about being and knowing for Aristotle and Aquinas. They hold that the individual things in the physical world, which are first given to us in sense experience and the primary things that we think about, are single wholes composed of the two intrinsic principles called form and matter. Form is the principle in the thing that makes it to be what it actually is. Form, in other words, accounts for the fact that a thing exists, is one, and has definite, distinguishing, knowable contours and is *this* rather than *that*. Matter is the principle in a thing as the stuff actualized and shaped due to form. Matter, in other words, is reality insofar as it is capable of being given existence, oneness, and intelligible contours, so that it is *this* rather than *that*. According to Aristotle and Aquinas, events of cognition or knowing, whether acts of sense experience,

which is particular awareness, or acts of thinking, which is universal awareness, take place first and foremost when the things in the world in virtue of their forms act on and actualize the living and wakeful perceptual faculties or the intellect of the human person. The forms of things can effect cognition in humans because [1] they are principles of act, of structuring rather than being structured they have the energy, actualization, or drive to affect or act on human faculties of knowledge and [2] they are principles of structure, content, intelligibility in their activity and motion they deliver the very structure, content, intelligibility for awareness that they cause physically in the things themselves. Aristotle famously presents this position about both perception and thinking as the first claim he makes about thinking in his account of the intellect in *De Anima* 3.4:

If thinking is like perceiving, it must be either a process in which the soul is acted upon by what is capable of being thought, or a process different from but analogous to that. The thinking part of the soul must therefore be, while impassible, capable of receiving the form of an object: that is, must be potentially identical in character with its object without being the object. Thought must be related to what is thinkable, as sense is to what is sensible.³

It is not difficult to see that this position supports and explains direct realism, which holds that human cognition directly and without representations grasps the actual features and natures of things.⁴ Direct realism is possible because things due to their forms act on perceptual faculties and the intellect. Perceptual faculties and the intellect do not act on things or on the forms received, but the reverse: they receive them. And things due to their forms act on perceptual faculties and the intellect in a way that conveys or delivers those things' actual cognitive structures, that is, what there is about and in them to perceive, think, and know. Nietzsche offers a telling contrast to this position. He too holds that things in the world act on our perceptual faculties causing awarenesses or images in us, but these images are not cognitions, strictly speaking, that is, they do not present features or dimensions of the things themselves conveyed through the thing's action on the human person.⁵ What passes for intellectual cognition in Nietzsche is completely caused by the action of the intellect in rela-

tion to the impact of things on our bodies.

Since all the action or doing in this foundational account of thinking as *nous* or *intellectus* is on the side of the thing, not the intellect, the event or act of such thinking in the human person is an event or act of rest or repose. Aristotle says that the intellect is a place where forms are received (places do not do anything to or affect that which is placed in them; *De An.* 1.4.429a27-28) and says that thinking resembles “a sort of rest or coming to a halt, and not motion” (*De An.* 1.3.407a32-33).⁶ Yves Simon ends his account of the Aristotelian and Thomistic position that sensation is not motion but rest in a profound way when he writes: “Unlike movement, sensation is an activity by way of rest. It is the first image of heaven.”⁷ When people die, we pray for their “eternal rest.” Heaven is rest as the vision of God face to face, total, utter, all-absorbing contemplation as the “beatific vision,” with no more struggles, no more action and movement to fulfill longings, to overcome frustrations, and to realize dreams. As Simon notes, sense perception, which is necessary for action in the world but often delightful in itself apart from doing anything, is a first form of rest as an intimation of heavenly rest. The thinking called *nous* or *intellectus*, which is also rest, is another, stronger intimation of heavenly rest.

1b. Thinking as *Dianoia* or *Ratio*

The other type of thinking recognized by Aristotle and Thomas is *dianoia* or *ratio*. This is the type of thinking, discursive and dynamic in character, that we probably would say that we possess if asked about the matter. *Dianoia* or *ratio* is the human intellect active, in motion, and at work, not at rest. It is the intellect at work with what has been given to it ultimately in original acts of *nous* or *intellectus*, in order to attain further objects for *nous* or *intellectus*. It is the intellect at work with all the moves and creativity at its command.

Within all the variety of human intellectual activity Aristotle and Aquinas hold that the intellect is active in two basic ways. One way is judging, where the intellect joins or separates two things discerned already. The linguistic form of the result of judging is either “x is y” (joining) or “x is not y” (separating). The other way is reasoning, where the intellect joins judgments together so that one judgment is affirmed on the basis of the others. Reasoning takes forms like “a is b; b is c; (thus) a is c” or “if a then b; b; (therefore) a.” Thinking or intellection of this discursive

sort is action by the mind, not rest, but it is interesting to note that when we attempt to represent the action and movement of the intellect by depicting judgments or pieces of reasoning, we cannot help but do so as completed actions, that is, as new moments of rest.

1c. The Relation Between *Nous* or *Intellectus* and *Dianoia* or *Ratio*

What is the relation between these two irreducible types of thinking? My late colleague at Catholic university, Thomas Pruffer, considering the relation between intellectual rest and motion, between *nous* or *intellectus* and *dianoia* or *ratio*, puts the issue this way: “Does rest (*nous*, *intellectus*, *intuitus*) include a potentiality for being complemented by motion (*logos*, *ratio*, *discursus*)?”⁸ If rest does not include a potentiality for being complemented by motion, then the two types of thinking are disconnected and disjoint. If this is the case, we may as well say that we have within us two intellects responsible for these two distinct and disconnected modes of thinking.

Thomas explicitly argues that there is only one intellect in humans responsible for these two types of thinking and he describes how the intellect moves in thought in order to be at rest. His argument is worth quoting at length (*ST* 1.79.8):

Reason (*ratio*) and understanding (*intellectus*) cannot be distinct powers in man. This becomes clear if you consider the acts of both. To understand (*intelligere*) is to apprehend quite simply an intelligible truth. To reason (*ratiocinari*) is to move from one thing understood (*de uno intellecto*) to another, so as to know an intelligible truth. And so the angels who, in keeping with their nature, have perfect possession of truth in its intelligibility, have no need to move from one thing to another, but simply, without intellectual process, grasp the truth of things, as Dionysius says [*De div. nom.* 7, PG 3, 868].

But men come to grasp intelligible truth by moving from point to point, as the same passage notes, and are therefore described as reasoning (*rationales*). Clearly, then, the relation of reasoning (*ratiocinari*) to understanding (*intelligere*) is that of motion to rest, or of acquiring to having: the first is of the incomplete, the second of the complete.

Thomas in this passage argues that humans need to move in thought in order to grow and develop in their possession and understanding of the truth of things. Unlike angels, we do not obtain the explicit and full truth of things all at once, but need to move from truths possessed to more truth, whether expansion of the truths already possessed, though possessed in a vague or partial way, or extension from the truths already possessed to other truths connected to them. What is clear in this account is that rest, resting with some intelligible truth, *nous* or *intellectus*, is superior to motion, whose aim is to move from some truth possessed to more truth. Rest is complete, Thomas says, because it has a present wholeness to it, whereas motion is incomplete, since by its very nature it is on the way to something it lacks.

For humans, however, unlike angels, there is always the need and the dynamic to move from possessed truth, which is rest, not motion, to fuller truth, which becomes, when attained, a new instance of rest. This need and this dynamic will never cease for us non-angelic intellects this side of heaven. It does not seem possible that we will reach complete intellectual rest as the full possession of the truth about all things in an integral and full way. We will, in this life, always have somewhere to go in our thinking. Our thinking and knowing will always be the mix of rest and motion that Thomas describes in the passage quoted above.

If this is the case, why is rest superior to motion as the complete is to the incomplete? Why is it not the case that our intellect's capacity for motion is what really matters and is what constitutes the glory of our intellectual life? I have been told by philosophy teachers that philosophy's value consists in processes of critical thinking, that is, specific types of motion in thought that philosophy teaches. Its value is not what it teaches or any truths that it purports to come to. Another question to ask is where does the impetus to motion come from? Does it come from the human intellect insofar as it is the ability for the thinking that is rest (*nous* or *intellectus*)? If so, there might be a paradox to ponder, namely, how does rest engender motion? Or does the impetus for motion come from the ability the human intellect has for thinking as motion (*dianoia* or *ratio*)?

Aristotle and Aquinas give primacy to intellection as rest—to *nous* and *intellectus*—because the intellect's ability to think in this way constitutes its openness to the things of the world, its ability to re-

ceive and absorb the things of the world. When this type of thinking occurs, there is genuine cognition. The thing is known as it actually exists, not according to some construct or construal that the intellect in its activity might place on it. This is why thinking as rest has primacy over motion. And this type of thinking happens all the time, according to Aristotle and Aquinas. It is an ingredient in all our thinking, at least in its most rudimentary forms. The intellectual discernments we make whenever we are awake and thinking, discernments and registrations about what kinds of things there are and that this is not that, occur all the time. We move from these discernments and registrations by means of activities of judgment and reasoning to more complex recognitions of what the world is like, which are new places of rest.

I presented above some examples of motion in thought, including this example of reasoning: "if a then b; b; (therefore) a." This is often a bad form of reasoning; it certainly is from a deductive standpoint. We can know that if the battery is dead, then the car will not start, and we can know that the car does not start. It may not at all be right to conclude that the battery is dead. The point is that motion and activity in thought can be faulty as well as correct. Motion from one point of rest to another can be good or bad. It can lead to more truth or to falsity. The issue then is where to find the norm to discriminate good from bad intellectual motion? Logic, the study of how to move well in thought, is an essential to good thinking. The ultimate answer about how to find and how to confirm that we have found truth is in our experiences of things themselves, insofar as they give themselves to us independent of our motion or activity, that is, insofar as they give themselves to us in their particularity through sense perception and their universality through *nous* and *intellectus*. This is another reason why rest has primacy over motion.

Another reason why thinking as rest has primacy over thinking as motion concerns where the impetus for intellectual motion comes from. Reasons for intellectual inquiry can and do come from our needs and our wants. We want to cure cancer or build up a business, and so we start thinking about things. Our particular and personal reasons and purposes for thinking are relatively extrinsic to the thinking process itself. For the intrinsic dynamic towards movement in thinking, we need to look at the thinking that is purely receptive on the part of the human intellect. This thinking of things wherein things give their meaning

and truth to us who receive it gives us the truth of those things in vague, general, and partial ways.

They begin by telling us that they are of a kind, so that we want to know more fully what it means to be of that kind, and so on. The content and meaning that things convey to the human intellect in basic and primordial acts of *nous* or *intellectus*, in the first thinking that we do of the world, through which we recognize and register intellectually the differences of things in the world, needs to be spelled out and articulated, and the relationships of the things we come to know, especially their causal relationships one to another, need to be explored and worked out. This is what motion in thought seeks to do. It is the aim of *dianoia* and *ratio*, as Thomas makes plain in the quotation above. The impetus for this motion, however, as Pruffer intimates in the way he puts his question does rest include a *potentiality* for being complemented by motion? is in the experience of rest itself, the experience of the thing as it gives itself to us in thinking that is *nous* and *intellectus*. The point of intellectual motion is to articulate and expand on the intelligible truth given in the thinking that is intellectual rest until this process is fully and comprehensively complete, which would mean full rest. It would be intellectual heaven.

Thus contemplation is thinking that is rest and communion with what there is in reality to be known. The thinking of all humans includes thinking that is rest as well as thinking that is motion. Thus all humans contemplate in this basic and primordial sense, whether they realize it or not. The issue for us, then, is whether we will become proficient and self-conscious contemplators, whether we accord to intellectual rest its primacy over the intellectual motion that we initiate. If we do, then we will move intellectually throughout our lives from the moments of rest that are given to us, however, limited and apparently minor in character and meaning, to deeper, more profound, and more satisfying moments of intellectual rest, and then have achievements of contemplation increasingly worth sharing with others.

2 Contemplation and Wisdom

Let us speak of wisdom. In *Metaphysics* 1.1-2 Aristotle speaks of wisdom in two intersecting ways. One way is giving a single definitive statement of what wisdom is. Wisdom is knowledge of the ultimate principles and causes of all that is (*Metaph.* 1.1.982a1-3). Wisdom in this sense is the knowledge

of everything altogether with full understanding of why things are as they are just as God has. Its possession by humans would make them godlike (*Metaph.* 982b28-983a11). We find it difficult to believe that anyone could attain wisdom in this straightforward and full sense, but we honor Saint Thomas Aquinas because he is one of the few humans ever who is even a contender for its realization.

The other way the Aristotle speaks of wisdom is to present an analysis of the full range of human knowing, that ascends from sense perception through memories and experience to the arts and sciences, where the highest and best science is wisdom itself as defined above. In this approach Aristotle does not consider that wisdom is one thing, but he talks about wisdom as present in degrees at each stage of knowing, from sense knowledge, which we share with other animals to full wisdom strictly speaking, which, if possessed, we share with God. We can see wisdom in sense knowledge as it gives us the present, in memory as it gives us the past, otherwise gone forever, in experience, as we see how wise an experienced ball-player, carpenter, or surgeon is over an inexperienced one, and in the various arts and in the sciences, so many of which are studied here at the university. There is a measure of wisdom in all these forms of knowing, but more and more wisdom at each higher stage.

Aristotle talks about many reasons why we say wisdom is present and why one type of knowing might be wiser than another, but a principal criterion is how much contact is there with things themselves and how penetrating and articulate is that contact. This is to say, how much genuine rest is there in thinking after how much motion.

The black Muslim activist Malcolm X describes in his famous *Autobiography* how in prison he taught himself to read by copying out the dictionary in notebooks, starting with the letter "A." He became a voracious reader, noting: "No university would ask any student to devour literature as I did when this new world opened to me, of being able to read and *understand*."⁹ Note that what Malcolm X is trying to describe he calls "understanding," which is exactly how Thomas's word for the act of *intellectus*, namely, *intelligere*, gets translated. Malcolm X goes on to describe how he would stay up all night in his cell crouching near the door to get some light to read. He adds "months passed without my even thinking about being imprisoned. In fact, up to then, I never had been

so truly free in my life.”¹⁰ The more Malcolm X let things in their reality, more and more things from A to Z, sink into and penetrate his being this is the rest of contemplation the more he was wise and the more he was free, as he himself says, even though he was in a prison cell.

The alternative to thinking as rest, to contemplation, is thinking as motion. If thinking as motion does not serve contemplation, to carry us from instances of rest to other instances where the nature of reality is more fully and articulately discerned, then the chances of wisdom are diminished or lost entirely.

For one thing, when thinking in motion is not in the service of rest, it is in the service of our own preoccupations, needs, aims, purposes, and desires. When this happens, things cannot speak for themselves, for we then end up seeing them construed and slanted according to our own preoccupations, needs, aims, purposes, and desires. This is at least seeing them in some way, and there can be some measure of wisdom in such thinking. What is worse is what Nietzsche argues for all thinking is action, no thinking is rest. For without the possibility of rest, without the possibility of the realities around and outside of us sinking into our awareness and registering in our souls unless we rest with things and stay quiet a bit and let them tell us what they are like we are thrown too much entirely back upon ourselves in our knowing and even when we make decisions and take action in the world. The Czech literary critic Erich Heller says of Nietzsche and of the poet Rilke, who agrees with Nietzsche, that they do not “praise the praiseworthy. They praise. They do not believe the believable. They believe. And it is their praising and believing itself that become praiseworthy and believable.”¹¹ This, in the end, is a sad, isolating, and frustrating way to live—loving our loving, rather than some other person for herself or himself; believing in believing, rather than trying to get the believing right; glorifying our choosing, rather than the worthiness and goodness of what is chosen.

In the thinking that we do, however mundane or unremarkable, is rest, which, however humble, is contemplation. In the thinking that we do is also motion. A prospect of wisdom opens up for each of us, growing throughout our lives, to the extent that we see what Thomas Aquinas sees (this would be a profound instance of rest) and place our activities of thought in the service of rest in the pursuit of more and more truthful intellectual rest. Dominicans claim as their

own the motto “to contemplate and to share what is contemplated” with the hope that they can do both well and knowing that the sharing part, the illuminating as well as the shining, is possible only because the motto fits everyone. I hope that you leave Ohio Dominican University appreciating just how much it fits you.

Kurt J. Pritzl, OP, PhD
1952 – 2011
IN MEMORIAM

Kurt J. Pritzl, OP, PhD delivered this Aquinas Convocation lecture on January 25, 2007, at Ohio Dominican University.

Father Kurt Pritzl, was a friar of the Eastern Province of the Order of Preachers. Fr. Pritzl served as Dean and Associate Professor of Philosophy at The Catholic University of America in Washington, D.C., until his death in February of 2011. A native of Milwaukee, Wisconsin, Father Pritzl earned a bachelor of arts degree summa cum laude in philosophy and mathematics from Marquette University, where he was inducted into Phi Beta Kappa as a junior. He studied for the Master of Arts degree and the PhD degree in philosophy at the University of Toronto. His training at the University of Toronto included certification in the philosophy and Greek program conducted by the Philosophy and Classics departments. While at the University of Toronto, he was a fellow of Massey College. In addition to his studies in philosophy Father Pritzl was graduated with the master of divinity degree in theology from the Pontifical Faculty of the Immaculate Conception at the Dominican House of Studies in Washington, D. C.

Fr. Pritzl began his teaching career at the University of Toronto. He was appointed to the faculty of the School of Philosophy in 1980 and rose through the ranks to his present position. A specialist in ancient Greek philosophy, Father Pritzl worked primarily in early Greek philosophy and the thought of Aristotle. He concentrated on ancient theories of knowledge and accounts of soul. His research focused on a comprehensive study of the explicit and implicit theories of truth in Aristotle’s writings. Father Pritzl published articles in Greek philosophy in leading journals in the field and has been selected as a visiting scholar for the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy.

Fr. Pritzl served as associate editor of *The Review of Metaphysics* and as reader in *Greek philosophy* for a number of scholarly journals. He was a member of the Executive Council of the American Catholic Philosophical Association. Father Pritzl was a member of the Corporation and Board of Trustees of Providence College. He has served on the Provincial Council of the Province of Saint Joseph, as Regent of Studies for his Dominican province, and as a member of the Vocation Council of the province. In addition to his academic duties at the University Father Pritzl preached regularly at parishes and retreat centers in the Washington area, served as a chaplain in the Teams of Our Lady movement, and was invited to serve as spiritual director at annual conferences of diocesan pro-life and natural family planning directors by the Secretariat for Pro-Life Activities of the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops.

Notes

¹ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, volume 47, *The Pastoral and Religious Lives (2a2ae. 183-9)*, ed., trans., and notes by Jordan Aumann (London and New York, 1973), pp. 204-5.

² This precise point is important. The intellect at rest is not the intellect asleep or inattentive, but rather the intellect alive, awake, aware, but not because of action or motion caused by or due to it.

³ *De Anima* 3.4.429a13-18. All translations of the texts of Aristotle are from *The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation*, ed. Jonathan Barnes, 2 vols. (Princeton, 1984), unless otherwise noted.

⁴ A recent defense of Aristotle's direct realism is found in Hilary Putnam, "Aristotle's Mind and the Contemporary Mind," pp. 7-28 in *Aristotle and Contemporary Science*, vol. 1, ed. Demetra Sfendoni_Mentzou (New York and other places, 2000); cf. Fred Sommers, "Putnam's Born-Again Realism," *Journal of Philosophy* 94 (1997): 453-71.

⁵ In fact, they are at two removes from things, which cause nerves to be stimulated, which in turn causes images. Friedrich Nietzsche, "On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense," pp. 82-3, in Friedrich Nietzsche, *Philosophy and Truth: Selections from Nietzsche's Notebooks of the Early 1870's*, ed. and trans. D. Breazeale (Amherst, N. Y., 1999).

⁶ Translation from Aristotle, *De Anima*, trans., intro., and notes by R. D. Hicks (Cambridge, 1907).

⁷ Y. R. Simon, "An Essay on Sensation," pp. 61-64, in *Philosophy of Knowledge: Selected Readings*, ed. Roland Houde and Joseph Mullally (Chicago, Philadelphia, and New York: J. B. Lippencott Company, 1960).

⁸ Thomas Prufer, *Recapitulations: Essays in Philosophy* (Washington, D. C., 1993), p. 103, n. 1.

⁹ Malcolm X, *The Autobiography of Malcolm X*, with the assistance of Alex Haley (New York, 1966), p. 173.

¹⁰ *Autobiography*, p. 173.

¹¹ Quoted by Lucy Beckett in her review of Roger Scruton, *Sex and the Sacred in Wagner's Tristan and Isolde*, in *Times Literary Supplement*, April 9, 2004, p. 24.

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